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ABSTRACT
Physical-layer key generation methods utilize the variations of the
communication channel to achieve a secure key agreement between
two parties with no prior security association. Their secrecy rate
(bit generation rate) depends heavily on the randomness of the
channel, which may reduce significantly in a stable environment.
Existing methods seek to improve the secrecy rate by injecting arti-
ficial noise into the channel. Unfortunately, noise injection cannot
alter the underlying channel state, which depends on the multipath
environment between the transmitter and receiver. Consequently,
these methods are known to leak key bits toward multi-antenna
eavesdroppers, which is capable of filtering the noise through the
differential of multiple signal receptions. This work demonstrates
an improved approach to reinforce physical-layer key generation
schemes, e.g., channel randomization. The channel randomization
approach leverages a reconfigurable antenna to rapidly change the
channel state during transmission, and an angle-of-departure (AoD)
based channel estimation algorithm to cancel the changing effects
for the intended receiver. The combined result is a communication
channel stable in the eyes of the intended receiver but randomly
changing from the viewpoint of the eavesdropper. We augmented
an existing physical-layer key generation protocol, iJam, with the
proposed approach and developed a full-fledged remote instrumen-
tation platform to demonstrate its performance. Our evaluations
show that augmentation does not affect the bit error rate (BER)
of the intended receiver during key establishment but reduces the
eavesdropper’s BER to the level of random guessing, regardless of
the number of antennas it equips.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Physical layer key generation schemes aim to establish a shared
key between two parties through an open channel eavesdropped by
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an adversary. The majority of the schemes leverage the changing
wireless channel to generate the key bits, with a generation rate
proportional to the entropy of the channel. The more random the
channel the faster the key is generated. A few other designs seek to
make key generation rate independent from the channel variation,
by injecting artificial noise into the wireless channel to aid security
[2, 3, 9, 10, 14]. The combination of the transmission and jamming
signal introduces uncertainty to an eavesdropper in the form of
noise [7, 8, 13], and prevents the eavesdropper from obtaining the
underlying key bits.
Gollakota et al. developed iJam, a robust friendly-jamming sys-
tem which improved the physical-layer key generation for station-
ary wireless networks [4]. The scheme lets the transmitter (Alice)
interleave two identical sequences of bits while the intended re-
ceiver (Bob) jams one at random. Since Bob knows which bits are
jammed and which ones are clear, he can select the clear bits and re-
construct the key, whereas the eavesdropper (Eve), being unaware
of Bob’s jamming targets, cannot recreate the key. To increase the
randomness of the channel, the key is repetitively transmitted until
Bob reconstructs the original message.
Although iJam can achieve secure key exchange in a static chan-
nel, Steinmetzer et al. identified a vulnerability by implementing a
multi-antenna adversarial model designed to take advantage of the
spatial variance to discern between the jammed and clean signals
[12]. The root of this vulnerability is due to the fact that the channel
states between Alice and Eve remain unchanged in spite of Bob’s
jamming signal, which allows Eve, equipped with multiple anten-
nas, to exploit the pilot or known symbols in Alice’s transmission
to estimate the channel and cancel its effect. Once Eve equalizes the
channel, she may evaluate the signal divergence among multiple
antennas to identify the clear symbol. Specifically, a symbol with a
large divergence among multiple antennas is likely to be jammed
and thus ignored. After a few iterations, clean transmission can be
spliced together, and the key can be known.
We propose a defense mechanism against such an attack by
combining channel randomization with prediction-based channel
equalization. Channel randomization has been used to strengthen
physical-layer security schemes, such as orthogonal blinding, that
are known to be vulnerable against multi-antenna eavesdropper
[1, 5, 6, 11]. The method leverages a reconfigurable or moving
antenna to create artificial changes in a wireless channel, result-
ing in unstable channel state information (CSI) between the trans-
mitter and receivers. The prediction-based channel equalization
cancels the randomizing effect for Bob by implementing an angle-
of-departure (AoD) estimation algorithm to predict the CSI for any
given antenna configuration. The combined results are that the
channel state appears stable for Bob but continuously changing for
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Eve. Furthermore, the channel prediction eliminates the need for pi-
lot based channel measurements, which denies Eve the opportunity
to measure and cancel the changing effects.
In this demonstration, we developed and implemented the chan-
nel randomizing iJam system with a custom reconfigurable antenna
and real-time AoD based channel prediction algorithm, to enhance
the security of the key generation protocol. The audience is granted
access to our remotely accessible platform via live-stream to control
and observe the real-time effects of channel randomization on Bob
and Eve. The increase in entropy contributes to both the key gener-
ation rate and the overall security. Our results indicate the CSI of
the intended receiver bit error rate (BER) does not fluctuate when
exposed to channel randomization while simultaneously worsening
a multi-antennae adversary’s BER to the level of random guessing.
2 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Consider an OFDM system shown in figure 1, where there are three
active parties; Alice, who wants to establish a secret key with an
intended receiver, Bob, and a passive eavesdropper, Eve. Alice, in
green, equips a rotating antenna to randomize the channel, and
a digital RF chain consisting of a compressed sensing-based AoD
estimation algorithm and a precoding filter to predict and cancel
the channel randomization effect for the intended receiver. Bob, in
blue, comprises of two stationary antennas, one for receiving, and
the other for jamming; while Eve, in red, uses two antennas and an
adaptive filter to exploit the spatial variance of the jammed signal.
2.1 Channel Randomization
The channel randomization is implemented by rotating a log-periodic
dipole array (LPDA) antenna using a stepper motor. The half-width
beam angle of the LDPA antenna’s main lobe is approximately 60
degrees. Hence, rotating the antenna by 60 degrees can significantly
change the channel state. The rotating speed of the step motor can
vary from 1 RPM to 5 RPM. The rotation is carried out in sync
with the data transmission, which prevents Eve from obtaining a
channel equalization filter to correct the randomization effects.
2.2 Channel Prediction and Equalization
In our scheme, Alice predicts and cancels the channel randomization
effect for Bob with a compressed sensing-based AoD estimation
algorithm. The CSI between Alice and Bob (or Eve) is due to the
combined result of multipath components and antenna patterns.
The compressed sensing algorithm allows Alice to estimate the
360-degree AoD vector, which defines the multipath components.
Given that Alice knows the antenna pattern for a specific antenna
mode, the CSI can be computed as the inner product of the AoD
distribution and the antenna pattern vector.
To predict the wireless channel, Alice selects every antennamode
then transmits pilot symbols to Bob at each mode. Bob measures
the corresponding CSI and sends it back to Alice using implicit
feedback. Alice then estimates the AoD vector with the compressed
sensing algorithm. Once known, Alice can predict the CSIs for all
unused antenna modes and computes the corresponding precoding
filter to cancel the changing channel effects for Bob.
2.3 Key Generation
With the addition of channel randomization and prediction we cre-
ated a less complicated physical layer key generation method. In
the original scheme, iJam, Alice and Bob switched roles between
transmitting and jamming to prevent adversaries who were unaf-
fected by the jamming signals. Channel randomization replaces
this method. In our scheme, Alice sends clean OFDM symbols to
Bob. Simultaneously, Bob transmits jamming signal at randomly se-
lected time intervals. Alice repeats the same message until Bob has
successfully jammed every bit. During this process, Eve compares
the captured waveforms from both of her antennas to differentiate
between clean and jammed samples.
The bandwidth and frequency are carefully selected to optimize
the trade-off between the speed and effect of randomization. The
rotating antenna has a limit of 5 RPM with five unique channel
modes. To put less strain on the AoD algorithm while providing
ample security, 16-QAM is selected. To successfully transmit the
repeated key before a new channel mode is selected, the transmis-
sion bandwidth is limited to 3.4 KHz. The key bits are randomly
generated at Alice’s side and shared with Bob through the software
detailed in the appendix.
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Figure 1: System Diagram
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 2: From top to bottom, left to right: (a) Network setup for remote demonstration. (b) Physical setup with Alice on the
right, Bob and Eve on the left. (c) The radiation pattern of the LDPA antenna. (d-f) LabView panels to visualize CSIs and data
transmissions.
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A DEMONSTRATION DESCRIPTION
The demonstration platform, consisting of four software-defined
radio(s), one-directional LDPA antenna installed on a rotary ac-
tuator, three omnidirectional antennas, and one computer server
running a customized LabView VI, is hosted in the Cybersecurity
Laboratory at the University of Hawai’i at MÄĄnoa (UHM) as dis-
played in figure 2(b). As illustrated in figure 2(a), remote access to
the platform is available through a Virtual Private Network (VPN)
gateway implemented on an Amazon EC2 instance. Once connected
to the platform, a user can launch the Labview program to rotate
the antenna, initiate communications between the USRPs, visualize
the wireless signal, and collect the data-traces for offline analysis.
A live broadcast will verify the antenna position.
The Labview graphical user interface (GUI), made available to the
public, contains the controls and displays necessary for the demon-
stration. The VI, shown in figure 2(d-f), allows users to perform
experiments and analysis. Users can control IQ rate, transmission
frequency and gain, bit number generation, rotation rate, and ex-
periment duration. The graphs in figure 2(d), depict the transmitter
signal constellation, symbol magnitude, and phase. Figure 2(e) dis-
plays magnitude and phase plots for signal reception verification
of one of the three receivers. Most importantly, in figure 2(f), Bob
and one of Eve’s antennas compare their CSI. Two scenarios will
run with and without channel randomization to observe the drastic
effect on an eavesdropping attack.
